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THE GREAT RECESSION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNITY POLICING
Matthew J. Parlow
During the last twenty years, community policing has been the
dominant approach to local law enforcement. Community policing is
based, in part, on the broken windows theory of public safety. The
broken windows theory suggests a link between low-level crime and
violent crime—that is, if minor offenses are allowed to pervade a
community, they will lead to a proliferation of crime and, ultimately,
a community plagued by violent crime. To maintain a perception of
community orderliness, many local governments adopted “order
maintenance” laws—such as panhandling ordinances and antihomeless statutes. This emphasis on cracking down on such low-level
offenses brought with it an increase in the needs and costs of
policing, prosecutions, jails, social services, and other related
resources.
When the economy was flourishing, local governments were able
to pay for the time- and resource-intensive broken windows approach
to community policing. The Great Recession, however, has forced
localities to think critically about whether they can sustain these
practices given budget cuts. This Article analyzes the effects that the
downturn in the economy has had on public safety budgets and the
changes that many local governments have made, and are continuing
to make, to adjust to decreasing revenue and resources. This Article
will also explore proposed changes to the current criminal justice
and social service systems that seek cost-effective approaches to
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deliver the same level of public safety to which communities are
accustomed. In particular, this Article will assess and evaluate
evidence-based decision-making—an emerging trend in some
criminal justice systems—as part of an evolving trend driven by the
effects of the Great Recession, but also stemming out of community
policing. Finally, this Article will use Milwaukee County, Wisconsin,
as an example of an evidence-based decision-making approach and
explain how it can fulfill the public safety goals of the broken
windows theory of community policing while creating a framework
that provides for “smart” decision-making that accounts for the
financial realities that most cities face.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last fifteen to twenty years has brought a paradigm shift in
local policing efforts—moving from a reactive approach to a
proactive one marked by community engagement and problemoriented policing processes. This shift spawned the rise of
community policing as a dominant trend in local policing.
Community policing is, in part, based on the seminal work of George
L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson’s Broken Windows.1 The broken
windows theory links minor public disorders—vagrancy, public
drunkenness, and panhandling, to name a few—to violent crime: If
such small offenses are allowed to pervade a community, they will
inevitably escalate and lead to a community plagued by violent
crime. Building on social psychology theory, the broken windows
theory views maintaining a perception of community orderliness—by
cracking down on low-level criminal offenses to stop their
proliferation or escalation—as central to keeping that community
safe. Community policing was designed on these premises, and thus
many local governments adopted “order maintenance” laws such as
panhandling ordinances, anti-gang statutes, anti-homeless statutes,
and anti-loitering laws, to take aim at maintaining order in their
communities. This focus on low-level offenses led to increases in
prosecutions and a demand for attendant needs such as jails, prisons,
and other social services related to the criminal justice system. This
trend in local policing also coincided with a wave of “tough on
crime” political rhetoric and policies.
The Great Recession2—and the related budget deficits faced by
many local governments—are forcing local governments3 to think
1. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/.
2. For the purposes of this article, the term “Great Recession” will refer to the significant economic
downturn that affected the United States and global economies beginning in 2007. See generally
Catherine Rampell, “Great Recession”: A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/
(detailing
the
etymology of the term “Great Recession”).
3. In this Article, I use the terms local governments, cities, and localities interchangeably to refer to
local government entities.
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critically about their commitment to community policing and the
costs associated with it. Can this dominant approach to local policing
remain intact with the economic realities faced by local
governments? Or might new local policing philosophies align with
fledgling movements in the criminal justice and social service
systems that seek to make difficult but cost-efficient decisions
regarding the allocation of scarce resources? This Article explores
these questions to determine what changes are in store for local
governments due to the current economic crisis and what their
implications are for localities. This Article will also examine the
proposed changes to the criminal justice and social service systems
that seek cost-efficient approaches that hark back to a rehabilitative
approach to low-level criminals—in somewhat stark contrast to the
“tough on crime” rhetoric that has pervaded the political debate.
Finally, this Article will assess and evaluate the broader implications
of these coalescing trends on local policing and criminal justice and
social service systems.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of community policing,
the most prevalent model of policing today. Part III briefly describes
the broken windows theory, which serves as a foundational basis for
this model of policing. Part IV describes some of the costs of
community policing—both for local governments and arrestees. Part
V explores how the financial downturn marked by the Great
Recession has affected local government funding and describes the
difficult funding choices communities face—related to police
services and more generally—because of these changed
circumstances. Part VI analyzes how cities have responded to
reduced funding in both traditional and nontraditional manners. Part
VII reflects on how these difficult economic times may provide an
opportunity for a more creative, holistic approach to policing and
social services—in the form of evidence-based decision-making—
that remains consistent with the broken windows theory of
community policing while adjusting to the realities of current local
government budgets. Part VII uses Milwaukee County as an example
of how some localities are embracing evidence-based decision-
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making to reinvent their criminal justice system during these
challenging economic times. Part VIII will provide some concluding
thoughts.
II. COMMUNITY POLICING
The term “community policing” has no settled definition. While
the goal of this Article is not to delve into the various iterations and
characteristics that collectively define community policing, a
working definition and understanding proves helpful for the purposes
of the forthcoming analysis. Community policing is a theoretical and
practical approach to policing that focuses on crime prevention, order
maintenance, and partnership with the community to achieve these
goals.4 The United States Department of Justice’s Office of
Community Oriented Police Services defines community policing as
“a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support
the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to
proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public
safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”5 As
described further below, community policing shepherded in a new
model of policing that valued decentralization, deep community

4. Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime
Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1254–55
(2000). Community policing is oftentimes linked with community prosecution, which is a newer
philosophy of prosecution that seeks to redefine the role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system
from merely punishing crimes to also helping prevent them. See M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove & Patricia
L. Fanflik, Community Prosecution, Rhetoric or Reality?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 211–12 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008). While a more indepth analysis of community prosecution is outside of the scope of this Article, this recognition of the
link between community policing and community prosecution will be helpful for the various issues
explored in this Article.
5. Community Policing Defined, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?item=36 (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). The United States
Department of Justice formed the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services in 1994—pursuant
to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994—to encourage and fund local
government community policing programs. See Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1596 (2002).
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partnerships, a problem-solving approach to crime and crime
prevention, and citizen satisfaction.6
Community policing rose to prominence in the 1980s after a
general consensus formed that police-community relationships were
severely strained and that there was a need for a different paradigm
for the legitimacy and effectiveness of local police forces.7 The
traditional model of the “warrior” police officer—”the detached,
aloof crime-fighter”—battling the enemy (that is, the public) was one
that had sown deep resentment in many communities.8 Law
enforcement organizations thus sought to change their image and
partner with their respective communities to better achieve a mutual
goal: a safe environment within which to work and live.9 At the same
time, new research emerged that called into question the efficacy of
traditional policing theories and practices. Studies questioned
whether some of the tenets of policing leading up to the 1980s were
effective: increasing the number of passive patrols in a
neighborhood; random and saturation patrols; and an emphasis on
rapid response times for 911 calls.10 Finally, crimes rates were also
on the rise during this time, which led to considerable fear in many
neighborhoods.11 The confluence of these three forces—the rise in
crime, poor relationships between many police departments and their
communities, and research questioning the effectiveness of
traditional police strategies—led to an environment where a
paradigm shift to community policing could, and did, occur.
Community policing thus ushered in an approach to policing that
deemphasized the “us against them” and “warrior police officer
versus the enemy” view and focused instead on collaboration and
partnership with the community.12 In this model, instead of patrolling
6. See Waldeck, supra note 4, at 1254.
7. See James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4–5 (2004).
8. Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L. REV. 1257, 1307
(2011).
9. See Forman, Jr., supra note 7, at 4.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id. at 6.
12. See id. at 4–5.
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neighborhoods in cars, police officers walk a beat within a
neighborhood so that they are visible, easily accessible to the
community, and better able to develop strong ties with community
stakeholders.13 The collaborative emphasis of community policing
provides the community with an opportunity to provide input
regarding the services that it receives and the types of problems it
would like addressed.14 Community policing thus embraces
collaboration with various community stakeholders: neighborhood
groups, grass-roots organizations, property owners, businesses, other
government officials and agencies, and the like. In making common
cause, the community can define its social norms and values.
Partnering with the police department ensures that those norms are
inculcated and respected in the community and enforced by the
police.15 This approach also allows the police and those they serve to
tailor specific solutions to the problems and challenges facing their
particular community.16
This ability for the community to help inform police decisionmaking comports with the problem-oriented approach to policing that
this model encourages. Indeed, community policing envisions a
problem-oriented approach where police officers collaborate with
key stakeholders in a community. This collaboration identifies
disorders and then devises solutions that seek to solve the underlying
problems.17 As discussed in Part VII, not all of these underlying

13. Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented Policing, 39 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (2010).
The traditional regimented and hierarchical decision-making and supervisory practices are also loosened
to allow the beat officer to creatively solve problems that he experiences in the community. Id. at 6.
14. See Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 420 (2010).
15. See Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former Neighborhood District
Attorney, 78 WASH. U. L. REV. 985, 986 (2003). But see David Thacher, Conflicting Values in
Community Policing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 765, 766–69 (2001) (noting that police and community
values may not always be compatible and, in fact, may actually be at odds).
16. See Reisig, supra note 12, at 5–6.
17. See Reenah L. Kim, Note, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The Need for
Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Boards, 36 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 461, 480–81 (2001). Problem-oriented policing involves police identifying and
understanding problems facing their community and crafting and executing a solution to these
problems—those that cause residents, businesses, and others to call the police for service and assistance.
Reisig, supra note 12, at 5–6. This approach has been characterized by four basic stages: scanning
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problems are necessarily crime related. Consequently, community
policing expects that the police department will engage and
collaborate with other governmental and social services agencies to
help address these problems.18 With the financial constraints
affecting local governments today, this holistic approach to
addressing disorder and its underlying problems may prove of even
greater importance in maintaining community policing and
attempting to stay true to the broken windows theory that underlies it.
III. BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY
The broken windows theory of policing provides one of the key
philosophical foundations for community policing.19 George L.
Kelling and James Q. Wilson first outlined the theory in their seminal
1982 article.20 In the article, the authors describe a Newark, New
Jersey neighborhood that implemented a police foot patrol after many
years of having only vehicle control.21 The foot patrol officer kept
order in the neighborhood by encouraging normatively desirable
behavior. For example, the officer would not allow drunks to sleep
on the main streets—rather, only in alleys—and he arrested people
for breaking informal rules of vagrancy.22 Interestingly, while the
neighborhood did not, in fact, see a reduction in crime after the
implementation of the foot patrol, residents nevertheless felt safe and
perceived that crime rates had dropped.23 This story served as the
(where police endeavor to identify and define the problem), analysis (where police seek to understand
the causes and magnitude of the problem), response (where police attempt to devise an alternative
approach to the current one that has proved ineffective), and assessment (where police determine the
efficacy of the approach and any alterations necessary to improve future responses). Id. at 7–8. While
community policing and problem-oriented policing are conceptually linked—and, indeed, many police
departments embrace them as interconnected—it is worth noting that problem-oriented policing does not
emphasize citizen involvement and collaboration as much as community policing. Id. at 9.
18. See infra Part VII and accompanying notes.
19. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Order-Maintenance Agenda as Land Use Policy, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 131, 132–33 (2010).
20. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. This point underscores a lesser-known foundational premise of the broken windows theory—
that is, that people do consider disorder when making a judgment about how safe their neighborhood is.
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conduit for Kelling and Wilson to develop their theory linking
disorder to violent crime.
While acknowledging that for many the link seems tenuous at best,
Kelling and Wilson claim that “at the community level, disorder and
crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental
sequence.”24 To this end, the authors theorize that if small infractions
such as vagrancy, public drunkenness, and panhandling—the broken
windows—are allowed to pervade a community, then crime in the
area will further proliferate, and the neighborhood will eventually be
riddled with violent crime.25 These obvious and visible signs of
disorder undermine the social, law-abiding norms in a community.26
The disorder signals that the community either cannot or will not
enforce basic social norms—a clear indication of a breakdown of
community control.27 If a community is unwilling or unable to
enforce social norms, it provides a reasonable inference to both
criminals and law-abiding citizens that the community similarly will
not or cannot prevent more serious crimes.28 This disorder leads
criminals to commit more serious crimes in greater numbers and
instills fear in the law-abiding stakeholders in the community.
Conversely, if criminals see more arrests for drunkenness, driving
violations, or other disruptions of order, they will believe arrest is
more likely and thus will be deterred from committing crimes.29
24. Id.
25. Id. The “broken windows” moniker derived from an experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo,
where he left a car sitting in the Bronx in New York City, New York, and another in Palo Alto,
California. Id. The Bronx, at the time, was filled with disorder and crime, and the car was vandalized
within ten minutes. The car left in Palo Alto—an affluent community with low crime and minimal
disorder—was left untouched for more than a week until Zimbardo broke one of its windows with a
sledgehammer. Within hours of Zimbardo doing so, the car was entirely ruined by others. Id. A similar
metaphor is an abandoned manufacturing plant building that remains untouched until a window is
broken, which triggers more windows being broken, followed by vandalism and other crimes, and
eventually the building being burned to the ground. Both metaphorical examples serve to demonstrate
the theory that even in an orderly neighborhood, once there are visible signs of acceptance of disorder,
further disorder and greater crime will inevitably follow.
26. See Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1513, 1528 (2002).
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A
Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 165 (1988).
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Indeed, as Professor Dan M. Kahan points out, “[I]ndividuals are
much more likely to commit crimes when they perceive that criminal
activity is widespread.”30 If there is no visible communal moral
rebuke of small crimes, people in the community will likely engage
in such behavior themselves because they perceive such actions to be
acceptable—with low risks and potentially high payoffs.31
Social psychology supports the broken windows theory. If people
see a weakening in the orderliness of a system, they begin to doubt
whether they can do anything to prevent such disorder.32 This doubt
feeds on itself, causing those in a disorderly neighborhood to be less
likely to report a crime because they think the police will not respond
in time or will not be able to do anything about the situation.33 This
devolving cycle leads to more crimes as those before them go
unreported and unpunished.34 The increase in crimes is also
accompanied by a greater seriousness in the type of crimes that are
committed. In this regard, disorder leads to citizen fear, which causes
citizens to physically and socially withdraw.35 Such withdrawal spurs
increased predatory behavior and rising crime rates—leading to a
spiral of decline in the neighborhood.36 Therefore, according to the
broken windows theory, a community must address disorder early on
so as to prevent the spiral of decline from eventually occurring.
The broken windows theory thus spurred policing responses that
sought to crack down on low-level criminal offenses to stop their

30. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 350
(1997).
31. Id. at 355–57. What further compounds this problem is that those who do not engage in criminal
activity will eventually leave the community, thus eroding some of the positive social influence
possibilities in the neighborhood. Id. at 371.
32. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 20.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ Views of the New
York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1219 (1998). Law-abiding citizens withdraw by
either moving to a different locality—if they have the resources to do so—or by avoiding the streets as
much as possible. In either case, the absence of such law-abiding community stakeholders increases the
concentration of criminals in the area and takes away a mediating presence—the law-abiding citizens
themselves—that might help deter crime. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 1528.
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proliferation, escalation, or both.37 For when police enforce basic
social norms, and when community stakeholders both obey and
embrace such norms, the community signals to criminals and lawabiding citizens alike that it is intolerant of criminal behavior.38 This
positive messaging, broken windows theorists posit, helps avoid the
downward spiral that communities with rampant disorder experience.
Accordingly, police seeking to adopt broken windows policing
strategies target both social and physical disorder. Social disorder
includes loitering, vandalism, gangs, public drinking, drug dealing,
prostitution, and street harassment.39 Physical disorder encompasses
building abandonment, graffiti, litter on the streets and sidewalks,
abandoned cars, junk and garbage in vacant lots, and the like.40 These
small quality-of-life crimes “contribute to a sense of disorder and
danger on the street.”41 Many communities thus adopted order
maintenance laws such as panhandling ordinances, anti-gang statutes,
anti-homeless statutes, anti-loitering statutes, and vagrancy statutes to
target these forms of disorder and avoid the devolution toward crime
that the broken windows theory describes.42 Police departments even
used civil laws like nuisance abatement and forfeiture laws to address
and prevent these quality-of-life criminal activities.43 This approach
supports the social influence theory’s focus on how a community’s
norms and behavior affect its conduct and the conduct of others

37. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1693 (2010). Interestingly, this strategy finds police departments
investing fewer resources in the areas of serious crimes—murder, armed robbery, etc.—and channeling
more of their resources into targeting the lower-level, disorderly misconduct. See Kahan, supra note 26,
at 1527.
38. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 1528.
39. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 51 (1990).
40. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public
Space: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 608 (1999).
41. William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department’s Civil Enforcement of Quality-of-Life
Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 447, 448 (1995).
42. See Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and
What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361,
1374 (2010).
43. See Bratton, supra note 41, at 452–63. Nuisance abatement laws allow police to close locations
where crimes occur, thus removing criminal activity from that area. Forfeiture laws allow the police to
seize cars used in soliciting prostitutes, effecting a drug deal, or even playing music too loud. See id.
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entering the community.44 Therefore, by adopting order maintenance
laws, communities can use social influence to discourage
criminality.45
However, this social influence aspect of the broken windows
theory is oftentimes misunderstood in community policing literature.
As Professor K. Babe Howell notes, “[O]rder-maintenance policing
as described in Broken Windows neither demands nor suggests that
zero tolerance arrest policies are efficient, desirable, or effective
methods to achieve order and reduce fear.”46 In fact, the broken
windows approach to community policing is not entirely based on
arrests. For example, the police officer in the Broken Windows article
did not arrest people, but rather enforced social norms by breaking up
arguments and asking drunks to move to different areas.47 Indeed,
under this approach, police seek to employ non-arrest approaches and
interventions—such as discussion, persuasion, negotiation,
counseling, and ordering—in an attempt to ameliorate the problem
without making an arrest.48 Nevertheless, despite this philosophical
and practical approach to non-arrest interventions, the broken
windows theory has led to a significant number of arrests for
relatively minor offenses during the community policing era.49
IV. THE COSTS OF COMMUNITY POLICING
Whether police attempt arrest or non-arrest solutions, the broken
windows approach to community policing requires significant
expenditures and resources by local governments.50 Foot patrols,
while beneficial for establishing better community relationships, are

44. Kahan, supra note 30, at 355–57.
45. See id. at 365.
46. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271,
279 (2009).
47. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 20.
48. See Reisig, supra note 13, at 26–27.
49. See id. at 27–29.
50. See Waldeck, supra note 4, at 1275 (noting that while many approaches to broken windows
policing used arrest as a last resort, arrest was still heavily relied upon by various police departments as
part of their community policing approaches).
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less efficient for police in terms of patrolling portions of the city. In
this regard, a police department needs more police officers than it
previously did to maintain such a visible presence in the community.
With the shift to community policing, police officers spend more
time attending community meetings and developing personal
relationships with key stakeholders in the neighborhood in order to
help understand the community’s challenges and devise strategies for
addressing them. While an effective use of the police officer’s time in
the theoretical construct of community policing, such efforts are
time-intensive and require more dedicated officers from a police
force than previous approaches to policing did.
Moreover, the broken windows approach to community policing
inevitably leads to arrests for the various low-level criminal offenses
that lead to disorder in a community. There are also tremendous
hidden costs in the time, money, and personnel required for “extra
arrests” and the costs to the local criminal justice system in
processing and prosecuting each misdemeanor.51 The police
department, the district attorney’s or city attorney’s offices, the
public defenders’ offices, and the local court system all spend a
significant amount of resources to process these minor offenses
through the criminal justice system.52 For example, many police
departments face substantial overtime expenses to pay for police
officers and other staff to process the increase in these quality-of-life
criminal arrests.53 There are also other externalized costs borne by
the city, and taxpayers more broadly, when an arrest and criminal
record leads an individual down the all-too-common spiral of
multiple subsequent arrests, incarceration, and unemployment.54
This is to say nothing of the significant costs to the individual
arrested for these low-level, quality-of-life crimes. The arrestee loses
significant time, money, and opportunity each time he or she is
51. See Howell, supra note 46, at 283–90, 307–14.
52. See id. at 292.
53. See id. at 307. Even setting aside the issue of overtime pay, the choice to have police officers
processing such arrests instead of being out in the community also poses a cost to the police department
and the community. See id.
54. See id. at 292.
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booked for a misdemeanor. He or she typically misses two to four
days of work (or school), which may lead to a loss of employment,
and the arrestee must also pay the processing fees for being
arrested.55 The criminal record that such an arrestee may wind up
with can prevent that person from getting a loan for a car, a house, or
schooling—thus limiting his or her options and potentially leading
that person back to committing more crimes.56 The arrestee—and
possibly his or her family—could be kicked out of public housing.57
All of these costs on the individual affect the community as well.
While the broken windows approach to community policing may
decrease fear in the community, it might also result in economic ruin
for the arrestee and thus create an even more desperate criminal.58
These costs have become more magnified in the past few years as the
Great Recession has taken a devastating toll on the economy more
generally and local government budgets more specifically.
V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND THE GREAT RECESSION
A. Sources of Local Government Funding
Local governments receive funding from six main sources: taxes,
federal government assistance, state government assistance, special
assessments, fees and fines, and borrowing.59 While local
governments do not have an inherent power to levy taxes, states grant
localities the power to tax through their constitutions, statutes, and
local home rule charter provisions.60 However, the local government
power to tax is often quite limited and not universally enjoyed in
every state.61 The most common and universal form of local

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 296.
See Howell, supra note 46, at 297.
See id. at 302.
See id. at 306–07.
See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL
SYSTEM 282–518 (2010).
60. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay for” Model
of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 383 (2004).
61. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 269 (2004).
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government tax is the property tax, while some localities are also able
to garner funds through taxes related to sales and other excise taxes,
local income, use, and licenses.62
Due to these limited taxation sources of revenue, local
governments rely on the other aforementioned sources of non-tax
revenues to help meet their budgets. The federal government has
historically given substantial financial aid to local governments
through block grants—categorical grants aimed at funding particular
programs, with specific requirements and conditions attached—
which gave local governments more discretion to use such funds for
a variety of policy areas.63 State governments also provide funding to
local governments through direct revenue sharing, education budgets,
and grants-in-aid (for specific purposes or uses).64 Special
assessments allow local governments to raise revenue by funding a
community improvement—such as infrastructure projects—by
assessing a fee to those property owners who will benefit from it.65
Localities also charge various fees and fines on businesses,
individuals, properties, and other entities for various regulatory,
licensing, permitting, and user purposes.66 Finally, local governments
also obtain money needed to meet their yearly budgetary obligations
by borrowing money and issuing bonds to repay their debt.67
B. The Effects of the Great Recession on Public Safety Budgets
Before the Great Recession began in 2007, these funding sources
for local governments were relatively stable and predictable.
However, with the financial downturn that the United States—and
the world more generally—has experienced in the past several years,

62. See Amnon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 949 (2006).
63. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of
Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 484 (2007).
64. See MANDELKER, supra note 59, at 461–63.
65. See Reynolds, supra note 60, at 397 (providing an overview of local government special
assessments).
66. See id. at 407–24 (detailing the various types of local government fees).
67. See Sean Carey, Note, Post-Davis Conduit Bonds: At the Intersection of the Dormant Commerce
Clause and Municipal Debt, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 121, 125–26 (2009).

1208

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

localities experienced severe reductions from virtually all of their
revenue sources that dramatically impacted their budgets. The federal
government significantly cut its funding to local governments in its
attempt to balance its budget and rein in the national debt.68 Many
state governments cut their funding to local governments—in a
variety of different areas—to help make up budget deficits.69 Cities
also saw a significant drop in tax revenues as housing prices dropped,
foreclosures proliferated, and spending (and thus sales taxes) dropped
significantly while unemployment rose and fear of worse financial
circumstances lingered.70 In addition, some cities bore additional
unexpected costs. Localities in California, for example, were forced
by state law to house prisoners formerly imprisoned in state facilities
in an attempt to save money at the state level.71
Police departments, and public safety budgets more generally,
were not immune to these difficult economic times for local
governments. A 2010 study conducted by the Police Executive
Forum revealed that fifty-one percent of police departments
responding to the survey had their budgets cut since the Great
Recession began.72 The average cut to police department budgets was
seven percent.73 Fifty-nine percent of those respondents also
anticipated cuts to their budgets in 2011.74 Another study showed that
eight-five percent of responding police departments had their budgets
68. See William Selway, U.S. Federal Budget Cuts to Hit Cash-Strapped Cities, Transit,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2011, 1:26 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-0412/u-s-federal-budget-cuts-to-hit-cash-strapped-cities-transit.html.
69. See, e.g., Howard Wilkinson, Ohioans Embrace New Reality, CINCINNATI.COM (July 2, 2011,
4:34 PM), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20110702/NEWS0108/107030320/Ohioans-embrace-newreality (detailing the significant cuts in state aid to local governments in Ohio and the likely fallout from
the cuts).
70. See Kelly Nolan, Fall in Property-Tax Revenue Squeezes Cities, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304521304576447940532071536.html (explaining the
difficulties cities are facing from decreased tax revenues).
71. See Andrew Blankstein & Robert Faturechi, L.A. County Jails May Be Out of Room Next Month,
L.A.
TIMES,
Nov.
11,
2011,
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-jails-release20111111,0,4128740.story.
72. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IS THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN FUNDAMENTALLY
CHANGING HOW WE POLICE? 1 (2010), available at http://www.policeforum.org/library/critical-issuesin-policing-series/Econdownturnaffectpolicing12.10.pdf.
73. See id.
74. See id.
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cut in 2010, with more than half of them experiencing a five percent
cut and nearly a quarter of them having a cut of ten percent or
more.75 Still another study detailed that seventy-eight percent of
responding major city police departments experienced budget cuts by
an average of 5.4%.76 As nearly any newspaper in the country would
likely report, police departments—like all other local government
agencies—have experienced, and will likely continue to face, budget
cuts during this economic downturn.
VI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES AND AN OPPORTUNITY BORN?
A. Traditional Approaches: Cutting Costs and Raising Revenue
The challenging economic times and attendant budget cuts have
forced police departments to make difficult decisions to balance their
budgets. There are several approaches that are worth analyzing
because of their potential impact on a police department’s ability to
continue with a broken windows approach to community policing.
Many police departments have laid off officers and made other
reductions in their workforces. Some police departments have
experimented with turning to private security firms for help with
police services—or at least permitting them to operate in certain
spheres—and “de-deputizing” certain police work so that civilian
employees can perform those tasks. Other cities and suburbs have
explored combining or regionalizing police services. Finally, many
cities have attempted various cost-saving measures and looked to
identify new, nontraditional revenue sources in an attempt to
maintain staffing and service levels.

75. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN
ON
AMERICAN
POLICE
AGENCIES
10–11
(2011),
available
at
http://cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e101113406_Economic%20Impact.pdf (citing the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) study Policing in the 21st Century: Preliminary Survey Results
(2010)). These cuts were already on top of budget cuts from previous years during the current economic
downturn. See id.
76. See id. at 11 (citing an unpublished study by the Major City Chiefs Association entitled Police
Economic Challenges Survey Results (2011)).
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1. Reductions in Police Department Workforces
To address budget cuts, many police departments have laid off
officers, made other personnel cuts, or left various jobs unfilled.77 In
fact, the United States Department of Justice estimated that by the
end of 2011, approximately 12,000 officers would have been laid off
by police departments and nearly 30,000 law enforcement jobs would
go unfilled.78 Some examples of police layoffs are breathtaking. The
City of Camden, New Jersey, announced in January 2011 that it was
cutting nearly half of its police force.79 The City of Flint, Michigan,
laid off 80 of its 260 police officers due to budget cuts.80 The City of
Paterson, New Jersey, eliminated one quarter of its police force—125
officers—to help combat a $70 million city budget deficit.81 The
effects of such cuts are even more staggering when considering the
significant amount of crime that each of these cities experiences.
Such a reduction in police officers has forced police departments
to alter and reduce some of their traditional services and practices.
Many police departments are prioritizing emergency calls over nonemergency calls.82 Others are making similar, though difficult,
decisions on what problems to focus on given their more limited
resources. For example, some departments are no longer responding
to motor vehicle thefts.83 The City of Detroit, Michigan, recently
followed the lead of other big cities in no longer responding to
burglar alarms unless the alarm company has verified that there is a

77. See id. at 13. In addition, many police departments also experienced cuts in overtime funding
and mandatory furlough days for police officers and other law enforcement personnel. See POLICE
EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 72, at 1.
78. See Kevin Johnson & David Jackson, Economy Costing 12,000 Cops Their Jobs, CHI. SUNTIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at 17, available at 2011 WLNR 21864539.
79. See Crime-Ridden Camden, N.J., Cuts Police Force Nearly in Half, CNN.COM (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-18/us/new.jersey.layoffs_1_police-force-police-officers-publicsafety?_s=PM:US.
80. See Joe Swickard & Dawson Bell, Flint Official: National Guard Not an Option to Fix Violence,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 27, 2011, available at 2010 WLNR 10896407.
81. See Paterson Police Plan to Protest Layoffs of 125 Officers, NJ.COM (Apr. 18, 2011, 7:55 AM),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/paterson_police_plan_to_protes.html.
82. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 35.
83. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 72, at 2.
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valid alarm.84 In a response to a reduction of 165 sworn police
officers, the City of San Jose, California, adopted a “modified
response policy” that reduces the number of police responses to nonemergency situations.85 To this end, the San Jose Police Department
(SJPD) no longer responds to noise complaints, recycling thefts,
traffic accidents in which no one is injured, fruit vending without
valid permits, and illegal parking.86 The SJPD also followed a
national trend of severely reducing, if not eliminating, its horsemounted police force.87 Other police departments reduced their
investigation follow-ups with property, computer, and financial
crimes; non-felony domestic assaults; narcotics; and other such
crimes.88 Some localities are reducing or eliminating police services
for community events such as parades, funerals, and high school
football games.89 Finally, cutbacks have forced some police
departments to require residents to file their own reports online or in

84. See Press Release, City of Detroit Police Dep’t, Verified Response Will Reduce 911 Calls for
False Alarms (Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://www.securitysales.com/files/DPD-Verified-ResponsePress-release.doc (noting that Salt Lake City, Utah; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Aurora, Colorado; Fremont,
California; and Madison, Wisconsin also have adopted this policy).
85. See John Woolfolk, San Jose Cops Unveil Plan to Cut Services to Businesses and Residents,
OAKLAND TRIB., Aug. 12, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16050912.
86. See id. The SJPD also implemented cuts to its gang-reduction officers in city schools and
drastically reduced the number of flight hours of the police helicopter in an attempt to close budget
deficits. See id.
87. See id. The cities of Boston, Massachusetts; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and San Diego, California, have
all entirely cut their horse-mounted police forces. See Jeff Martin, Mounted Police Fading in Sunset?,
USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-02-11-mountedpolice_N.htm. There are only one hundred existing horse-mounted police units in the country, down
from nearly three hundred just ten years ago. See id.
88. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 20. The City of Sacramento,
California, eliminated its entire narcotics and gangs units due to budget cuts. See id. at 22. Other cities
are seeking to cut their crossing guard programs to help close budget gaps. See Anna Carrera, SP Police
May Cut Crossing Guard Program, WKOW.COM (Oct. 7, 2011, 7:21 AM),
http://www.wkow.com/story/15645505/sp-police-may-cut-crossing-guard-program (noting a similar
plan in Stevens Point, Wisconsin); Anne Jungen & Patrick B. Anderson, Police Department Wants to
Cut Crossing Guard Program to Save Money, LA CROSSE TRIB. (Sept. 15, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://lacrossetribune.com/news/local/article_ed309876-df52-11e0-b330-001cc4c002e0.html
(explaining such a proposal in La Crosse, Wisconsin).
89. See Police Budget Cuts Force Victims to Solve Property Crimes on Their Own, KREM.COM
(July 14, 2011, 7:17 PM), http://www.krem.com/news/local/Police-budget-cuts-force-victims-to-solveproperty-crimes-on-their-own-125611808.html (detailing how Beloit, Wisconsin, is making such cuts
due to budget constraints).
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writing for lower-level crimes such as break-ins.90 With the
reductions in police personnel that many cities are experiencing,
some police departments have no choice but to make such difficult
decisions.
2. Partnering with Private Security Firms and Civilianizing Police
Work
Cities and their police departments have also tried to cut costs by
working with private security firms—or at least allowing them to
function in certain capacities and locations.91 The use of private
security guards in specific areas of a city—in downtown or particular
tourist locations—was not uncommon before the Great Recession.92
However, the recent budget cuts have led some police departments to
collaborate with, or even hire, private security firms to help them
with providing police services. For example, the Minneapolis Police
Department (MPD) collaborates with private security officers in the
downtown business district to help reduce crime through enhanced
communication, wireless cameras placed in strategic locations, and
MPD training of these private security officers.93 Cities such as Las
Vegas, Nevada; Wilmington, Delaware; New York City, New York;
and Durham, North Carolina, have all collaborated with private
security firms to reduce their costs while maintaining their
effectiveness.94 Some cities have even sought to go further than such
collaborations. The City Council in Oakland, California, had
originally voted to hire private armed security guards to patrol high90. See Kevin Johnson, Cutbacks Force Police to Curtail Calls for Some Crimes, USA TODAY
(Aug.
25,
2011,
2:19AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-08-251Anresponsecops25_ST_N.htm (noting such a move by Oakland, California; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and
Norton, Massachusetts).
91. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 22.
92. See Marco Caffuzzi, Note, Private Police and Personal Privacy: Who’s Guarding the Guards?,
40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 225, 226–29 (1995) (commenting on the rise in private policing during the
1990s).
93. See Lucy Gerold, Downtown Security Collaborative, POLICE CHIEF MAG., July 2006, available
at
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=930&issue_id
=72006.
94. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 24.
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crime areas of the city, but the contract was later rescinded when the
company with whom it contracted, International Services, Inc., was
indicted for fraud.95 With the significant cost savings in private
security officers compared to sworn public police officers, it is no
wonder that many cities are exploring how they might use or partner
with private security firms.
Other police departments have increased the duties of civilian
workers by assigning them tasks that deputized police officers have
traditionally performed. By shifting such clerical and non-lawenforcement activities to civilians, police departments can deploy
their sworn officers into the field to deal with more pressing crime
needs.96 Some cities have explored responsibilities for civilians
beyond the traditional clerical activities. For example, the City of
Mesa, Arizona, created a civilian investigation unit in 2009 to
respond to low-level crimes and conduct investigations.97 These
civilian investigators take initial reports and collect DNA and
fingerprints at the crime scene, but they are not armed and do not
have the authority to make an arrest.98 The City of Chicago, Illinois,
has similarly sought to cut costs by civilianizing traditional police
work, hiring 104 civilian detention aides at city jails and transferring
the police officers stationed there to beat patrols.99 Such
civilianization has helped many cities save money in an era of
dwindling budgets.100

95. See Bobby White, Cash-Strapped Cities Try Private Guards Over Police, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
2009, at A4, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027127337237011.html.
96. See Alan Gomez, Civilians Help with Minor Police Duties, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2008, 12:01
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-03-30-civiliancops_N.htm.
97. See Nathan Gonzalez, Mesa Civilian Investigators Save Money, Create Rapport with Public,
ARIZ.
REPUBLIC
(July
19,
2010,
9:20
AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/articles/2010/07/19/20100719mesa-civilian-policeinvestigators0717.html. The San Francisco Police Department also started a civilian investigation unit in
2010. See San Francisco PD Tries Out Civilian Investigators (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 2, 2010),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128923342.
98. See Gonzalez, supra note 97.
99. See Kristen Mack, Emanuel, McCarthy Shift 138 Officers from Jail Lockups to Beat Patrol, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 6, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-06/news/chi-emanuel-mccarthy-shift138-officers-from-jail-lockups-to-beat-patrol-20111006_1_mayor-rahm-emanuel-officers-on-citystreets-patrol.
100. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 23 (noting that the civilianization
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3. Combining or Regionalizing Police Service
Some cities and suburbs have explored the idea of combining or
regionalizing police service. Modeled after regional police service
approaches in San Francisco, California; Denver, Colorado; Las
Vegas, Nevada; and San Antonio, Texas, many communities have
sought to either merge city police departments and county sheriff
departments or merge small suburban police forces into a regional
police force.101 In one survey, twenty-six percent of responding
police departments reported that their county partnered with a
neighboring county to consolidate police service, while another
thirty-one percent of respondents have had discussions with other
localities regarding such consolidation.102 Other cities have even
disbanded their police departments and contracted with their local
sheriff’s department for police services.103 While such proposals to
combine or regionalize police services are often met with resistance
and controversy—because of concerns about centralizing a
government service as community-tailored as policing and crime
prevention—consolidation, regionalization, or even outsourcing
policing services to the local sheriff’s department may be the most

program in San Francisco saves up to $40,000 per civilian in training, equipment, and benefit costs
compared to hiring a police officer for the position). Some cities have also used volunteers to do clerical
work and to serve as reserve officers to help save money. See id. at 24–25.
101. See, e.g., Roberto Acosta, Police Chiefs in Burton and Grand Blanc Township Talk About
Consolidation,
FLINT
J.
(July
30,
2011,
12:00
PM),
http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2011/07/police_chiefs_in_burton_and_gr.html (discussing
the possible consolidation of two townships); Ken Carlson, Tepid Response Meets Idea to Combine
Modesto
Police,
County
Sheriff,
MODESTO
BEE
(Apr.
7,
2010),
http://www.modbee.com/2011/04/06/1633647/merge-police-sheriff.html (detailing a proposed merger
of the Modesto Police Department and the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department). See also CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 30 (noting other consolidation arrangements in various
localities).
102. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 29 (citing the 2011 National Survey of
County Elected Officials).
103. See, e.g., Katie Dunn, Hoschton Dissolves Police Department to Save Money, GAINESVILLE
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/archives/28321/ (detailing the defunding of the
City of Hoschton, Florida’s police department and the contract with the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office
for police service); Ashley McNamee, Roanoke Police Department Disbanded, CINEWSNOW.COM (July
15, 2010, 11:55 AM), http://www.cinewsnow.com/news/local/46678142.html (noting that the village of
Roanoke, Illinois, disbanded its police department and contracted with the Woodford County Sheriff’s
Department for police services).
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cost-effective way for some communities to deal with the current
economic times.
4. Cost-Cutting Measures and New Revenue Sources
Some cities are attempting to counter budget reductions through
various cost-saving measures. For example, Chicago is seeking to
curtail the police department’s current sick leave policy and to close
underutilized police stations.104 Many police departments have been
forced to cut back or eliminate plans to acquire technology to aid in
their work.105 Other local governments have sought to reduce
expenses at their jails. Given that medical costs are the largest service
costs for most local government jails, it is unsurprising that cities
have sought to save money on these expenses.106 Some counties have
begun treating patients inside of the jails instead of transferring them
to external facilities; switching from name-brand medications to
generic ones; and creating better monitoring of inmate medication
distribution and use to decrease the amount of unused medicine.107
Other local governments have privatized the medical services that
they provide in their jails in an attempt to save money.108
Some counties have sought to reduce the cost of feeding their
inmates. For example, fourteen counties in New York are saving
104. See Frank Main, Chicago Police Department Cracks Down on Sick Leave Abuse, CHI. SUNTIMES (Sept. 6, 2011, 10:02 PM), http://www.suntimes.com/news/crime/7506385-418/chicago-policedepartment-cracks-down-on-sick-leave-abuse.html; Charles Thomas, City May Close Some Police
Stations
to
Save
Money,
ABC
7
NEWS
(Sept.
19,
2011),
http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=8359789.
105. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 72, at 2.
106. See Matt Cecil, The Costs of Living, In Jail, OR. CAPITAL NEWS (July 26, 2011),
http://oregoncapitolnews.com/blog/2011/07/26/the-cost-of-living-in-jail/.
107. See, e.g., Mark Wiggins, McLennan County’s Jail Doctor Outlines Ambitious Plan for Cuts,
KXXV.COM (Jan. 14, 2011, 5:11 PM), http://www.kxxv.com/story/13846656/mclennan-countys-jaildoc-outlines-ambitious-plans-for-savings?redirected=true (noting McLennan County’s attempt to save
money on medical costs); see also OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, COST-SAVING AND
COST-CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES FOR NEW YORK STATE’S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 13 (June 2009),
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/costsavingcontainment.pdf (noting and explaining the
use of telemedicine—the practice of treating inmates over a closed-circuit Internet video or data feed—
by many New York localities to save money on medical services).
108. See, e.g., Steve Schultze, Jail Health Care Change Announced, JSONLINE (Sept. 28, 2011),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/130731963.html (explaining Milwaukee County’s privatizing
of its jail medical services).

1216

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

money by purchasing “Cook Chill” food products that allow a mere
reheating of the food to be served to inmates.109 The switch to this
type of food preparation model is estimated to save these counties an
average of $730 per inmate per year.110 Sauk County, Wisconsin, no
longer provides warm breakfast for inmates and instead serves only
cold cereal—saving approximately $50,000 per year.111 Polk County,
Florida, eliminated peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, cornbread,
coffee, and juice from its jail menu to save money.112 The Sandusky
County Jail in Ohio grows produce in a garden to use for meals in the
jail—an effort that has saved $20,000 in food costs.113 Some counties
have also pursued privatization of their food services, which will
save one county at least $700,000 per year.114
Local governments have also attempted a hodgepodge of other
cost-cutting measures to address the financial strains their budgets
face. To save on electricity costs, Hays County Jail in Texas moved
lights out from 1:30 a.m. to 11:00 p.m.115 The Barrow County
Detention Center in Georgia mandated that all incoming and
outgoing mail be in the form of postcards to reduce the time spent on
opening and inspecting mail.116 Some localities have used inmates for

109. See OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, supra note 106, at 12.
110. Id.
111. See Steven Elbow, Hot Breakfast Nixed for Sauk County Inmates, CAP TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011,
7:00 AM), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/crime_and_courts/blog/article_6e6fbb14-2a4b-11e0bf08-001cc4c002e0.html. The County of Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin, no longer provides milk with
every meal, but rather gives inmates a glass of water with a packet of fruit punch powder for lunch and
dinner—saving the county approximately $16,000 per year. See Krista Hostetler, Chippewa County Jail
Reducing Milk Intake for Inmates, WQOW.COM (Mar. 29, 2011, 7:17 PM),
http://www.wqow.com/Global/story.asp?S=14345401.
112. Colleen Jenkins, Florida Jail Ends Free Underwear for Jail Costs, REUTERS (July 15, 2011,
11:27
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/15/us-florida-jail-underwearidUSTRE76E3XS20110715.
113. See Lisa Cornwell, Program Gives Inmates Green Thumbs, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 1,
2011, 5:51 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/08/01/program-gives-inmatesgreen-thumbs.html.
114. See Carol Demare, Jail Food Goes Private in Cost Test, TIMESUNION.COM (Nov. 12, 2010,
12:00 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Jail-food-goes-private-in-cost-test-809437.php
(explaining the privatization of food service at the Albany County Jail).
115. See Patrick George, Hays Sheriff Puts Inmates to Work at Jail to Save Money, STATESMAN.COM
(Jan. 30, 2011, 8:49 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/local/hays-sheriff-puts-inmates-to-work-atjail-1220705.html.
116. See Sheriff: Jail Mail Policy Working Well, BARROW J. (Oct. 2, 2010),
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general labor—such as mowing lawns, shoveling snow, picking up
litter, weeding, maintaining parks, and caring for buildings—which
enables them to cut the costs of these services from their respective
budgets.117 Finally, some localities are considering consolidating jails
and jail services in order to save money.118 These are just some
examples of the lengths that local governments are going to in order
to cut costs given the current budget cuts to public safety spending.
Cities are also looking to nontraditional revenue sources in an
attempt to maintain current staffing and service levels. For example,
Chicago proposes raising $25 million in new revenue through the
reallocation of tax increment financing (TIF) funds in order to hire
250 new police officers.119 Many localities have used fundraising and
community philanthropic efforts to raise additional revenue.120
Several counties in Michigan, Wood County in Wisconsin, and
Riverside County in California have all started billing inmates for
their stay in jail.121 Polk County, Florida, now charges male inmates
http://www.barrowjournal.com/archives/3838-Sheriff-Jail-mail-policy-working-well.html.
117. See, e.g., Jail Work Release Program Expands in Brown County, WTVB.COM (Aug. 24, 2011,
10:39
AM),
http://wtvbam.com/news/articles/2011/aug/24/jail-work-release-program-expands-inbrown-county/ (noting the general labor that inmates perform in Brown County, Wisconsin); Joe
Moszczynski, Requests for N.J. Inmate Labor Increase as Cash-Strapped Towns Look to Cut Costs,
STAR-LEDGER
(Mar.
14,
2011,
9:45
PM),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/03/requests_for_nj_inmate_labor_i.html (detailing the Sheriff’s
Work Assistance Program (SWAP) in several New Jersey counties).
118. See Domingo Ramirez Jr., Four Northeast Tarrant Cities to Share Jail, Communications Center,
STAR-TELEGRAM.COM
(Sept.
25,
2011),
http://www.startelegram.com/2011/09/25/vtouch/3395826_four-northeast-tarrant-cities.html (detailing how the cities of North Richland Hills,
Richland Hills, Halthom, and Watauga agreed to a consolidation plan for their jails, and how these
communities expect to save from $260,000 to $335,000 with this move).
119. See Thelma Sardin, Emanuel Unveils Crime Plan, WKLY. CITIZEN (Jan. 12, 2011),
http://www.thechicagocitizen.com/community-focus/emanuel-unveils-crime-plan/. Questions have been
raised regarding whether Illinois’ TIF statute would allow for such a reallocation of TIF funds. For
general information regarding the TIF districts, funding, and issues surrounding them, see generally
Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local
Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65 (2010).
120. See Mark Ambrogi, Lions Fish Fry Nets $3,400, INDYSTAR.COM (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.indystar.com/article/20100916/LOCAL0103/9160395/Lions-fish-fry-nets-3-400 (noting that
the County of Hamilton, Ohio, receives money from the Westfield Lions Club’s fish fry and Texas Hold
‘Em Poker fundraiser to pay for inmate reading glasses); Deena Yellin, Budget Cuts Force N.J. Police
Departments
to
Get
Creative,
HERALD
NEWS
(Sept.
21,
2011),
http://www.lawofficer.com/article/news/budget-cuts-force-nj-police-de (explaining how the Mahwah
Police Department has used various fundraising activities, including a fashion show, to raise money to
help meet its budget).
121. See Christina Hall, Jail Inmates Get Billed for Stay—But Few Pay, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 7,
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for underwear—a move that has an estimated savings of $45,000 per
year.122 Riverside County, California, also plans on charging inmates
for using public defenders.123
B. Creative Alternatives to Traditional Incarceration
Other local governments are using the current budget crises to
rethink their traditional approaches to policing (including the broken
windows approach to community policing), which have focused
heavily on incarceration. Indeed, the financial realities of an
incarceration-dominant approach to policing pose an expensive
challenge for most local governments. To illustrate the point: A city
or county often spends $100 or more per day to house a criminal (or
someone accused of a crime)—a daunting figure given the increase in
the number of incarcerated individuals in most jails.124 It is no
wonder, then, that many localities are rethinking an incarcerationdominated approach to community policing. But to simply look at the
creative alternatives, described below, as solely money-based would
be to oversimplify these cities’ and counties’ motivations. As this
sub-section and the Milwaukee County experience (detailed below)
demonstrate, those in the criminal justice system in many localities
are seeking to approach the problems of crime and disorder in a
smarter and, arguably, more effective manner than the traditional
“tough on crime” ethos that has pervaded the criminal justice
system—and political discourse more generally—for decades. While
the costs of the current system may be a significant motivating factor
2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 2407421 (noting the counties in Michigan); Kathleen Miles,
Riverside Charges Inmates for Stays in “Prison Hotels”, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2011, 1:46 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/03/riverside-charges-inmates_n_1075129.html (noting the
billing system in Riverside County); Wood County to Start Charging Inmates for Jail Stays, JSONLINE
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/127934438.html (noting the billing system in
Wood County).
122. See Jenkins, supra note 112.
123. See Miles, supra note 121. To collect the legal fees, the county intends to place a lien against the
inmate’s personal property and then collect the money when that property is sold. Id.
124. See, e.g., Cecil, supra note 106 (explaining that Mutnomah County, Oregon, spends
approximately $127 per day to house the average inmate); Leon Fooksman & Rachael Joyner, Remedies
Sought for Crowded Jail: Costs of Incarceration Rising Fast, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Jan. 10, 2008),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-01-10/news/0801100032_1_jail-inmate-jail-population-fights
(noting that Palm Beach County, Florida, spends almost $100 per day to house an inmate).
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for why these communities are rethinking their approach to the
criminal justice system, the communities’ impetus also stems from a
desire to better achieve their goals for a safe community and to help
those who may need social service support to avoid recidivism and
problems in the future.
Many localities are using house arrest for pretrial detainees, for
parolees, and even as a criminal sentence.125 Local governments
design these programs to enable those who commit, or are accused of
committing, certain low-level, nonviolent crimes to serve their
sentences at home, monitored by an electronic ankle bracelet.126 One
obvious benefit for these localities comes in the form of cost savings,
such as not having to pay for an inmate’s health care, food, and other
related expenses. In this regard, the results have been promising thus
far. Scottsdale, Arizona, for example, saved $200,000 in the first five
weeks of its electronic monitoring program for drunk driving cases,
and Cook County, Illinois, cut its cost per detainee from $142.60 per
day to $64.74 with electronic monitoring.127

125. See, e.g., Michael Miller, Southern New Jersey Jail Inmates Serving More Sentences at Home,
Easing Overcrowding and Saving Counties Money, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Feb. 13, 2011, 7:47 PM),
http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/press/atlantic/southern-new-jersey-jail-inmates-serving-moresentences-at-home/article_2e873422-37d5-11e0-8192-001cc4c03286.html (detailing the use of
electronic monitoring in Atlantic City, New Jersey, for its day-reporting program, home detentions, and
pretrial release of suspects).
126. See Amanda Boardman, For Criminals, No Place Like Home, DALLASNEWS.COM (Aug. 23,
2010, 2:27 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20100823-Dallas-County-salternative-sentencing-program-5942.ece (detailing the alternative sentencing plan in Dallas County,
Texas); see also Kayla Anderson, County Resumes Controversial House Arrest Program, KOB.COM
(Mar. 31, 2011, 9:49 PM), http://www.kob.com/article/stories/S2045476.shtml (explaining the house
arrest program in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, in which inmates are on an ankle monitoring system
instead of behind bars); Kathy Coffta Sims, Bracelets that Track Criminals, THE POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse, NY), Feb. 12, 2008, at B1 (noting a similar program in Madison County, New York).
127. See Ofelia Madrid, Electronic Monitoring Saves Money, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Nov. 23, 2010, 12:00
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2010/
11/23/20101123nehousearrest1123.html (detailing Scottsdale’s cost savings); Number of County
Criminal Suspects on Electronic Monitoring Surges, THEDOINGSOAKBROOK (Oct. 6, 2011, 9:10AM),
http://oakbrook.suntimes.com/news/8064224-418/number-of-county-criminal-suspects-on-electronicmonitoring-surges.html (noting the cost savings for Cook County, Illinois). Electronic monitoring in
drunk driving cases has become more prevalent because of such cost savings. See, e.g., Matthew
Kemeny, Counties Turn to Electronic Monitoring to Cut Costs, Curb Overcrowding in Prisons,
PENNLIVE.COM (Feb. 24, 2010, 7:17 PM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2010/
02/counties_turn_to_electronic_mo.html (detailing the use of electronic monitoring for drunk driving
cases in Perry County, Pennsylvania); Jennifer Sullivan, Seattle Courts to Trade Jail for Ankle
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However, such programs also seek to avoid substantially
disrupting the lives of those accused of crimes or those who have
committed low-level crimes. In doing so, these programs aim to help
these people avoid a downward spiral of more frequent and more
serious criminal acts because they have lost their jobs and support
systems. For example, house arrest and electronic monitoring
programs aim to allow these low-risk criminals to hold (or continue
to hold) jobs and enjoy the help and support of their families—
factors that can help these criminals avoid recidivism.128 For
example, Dallas County, Texas, saved $400,000 in the first year of its
house arrest program, and it also saw 273 out of the 281 offenders
successfully complete the program.129 Through such programs, local
governments seek to help ensure that those accused or convicted of
minor crimes—who are not serious threats to the community—can
maintain some semblance of their normal lives and thus avoid the
significant costs and disruptions that often come with being arrested
or convicted of such low-level crimes.
Localities are also adopting or expanding alternatives to traditional
incarceration, such as work release and halfway houses. Work release
programs allow nonviolent misdemeanor and low-level felony
offenders to maintain jobs in the community while serving their
ordered jail sentence.130 In order to be eligible for and complete a
work release program, the convicted criminal must obtain a written
order from a judge, comport with the rules of the program, and
maintain a job.131 Some counties have used weekend incarceration
and work release—in conjunction with electronic monitoring—to
Bracelets, SEATTLE TIMES (May 10, 2011, 10:02 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/2015017712_duibracelet11m.html (noting the Seattle Municipal Court’s use of electronic
monitoring). Other counties have saved even more money by moving to an electronic monitoring system
for low-level offenders by charging the criminal or the accused for most, if not all, of the electronic
monitoring costs. See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 126 (explaining that those participating in the
electronic monitoring program pay for ninety percent of the costs).
128. See Boardman, supra note 126.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., SEDGWICK CNTY. PUB. SAFETY, WORK RELEASE PROGRAM 1 (June 2010),
http://www.sedgwickcounty.org/Criminal_Justice/Fact%20Sheets/Work
%20Release%20Program.pdf (detailing the work release program in Sedgwick County, Kansas).
131. Id.
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enable inmates to work at county facilities, such as the zoo or
veterans’ cemetery, and also allow them to sleep at home after
work.132 Other counties have linked work release with halfway
homes—a scenario where inmates sleep at the halfway house at night
but leave during the day for their court-approved work.133 Finally,
some counties have established day reporting centers for nonviolent
offenders—usually alcohol and drug abusers—who cannot make
bail.134 Under a traditional system, these offenders would spend
weeks in jail waiting for court hearings for failure to post bail. Under
the day reporting center programs, these offenders report daily to the
center and are subject to random drug tests.135 In addition, these
offenders receive vocational training and, if they complete the

132. See Miller, supra note 125. This work release program in Cape May County, New Jersey, saved
taxpayers $357,964 through 29,032 hours of work by the inmates in 2010. Id.
133. See Tom Barnes, Prison Head: Release Short-Term State Inmates to Halfway Houses, POSTGAZETTE.COM (Mar. 2, 2010, 11:53 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10061/1039687-100.stm.
Other counties have dealt with jail overcrowding and the need for cost control by simply releasing
nonviolent criminals from jail earlier than their scheduled release date. See Don Hamilton, County:
Have
Jail,
Will
Share,
PORTLAND
TRIB.
(Feb.
4,
2005),
http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=28215 (noting how Multnomah County,
Oregon has been forced to release some inmates that it would rather keep imprisoned, due to financial
constraints). Overcrowding and cost control pressures have forced some counties to rely on citations as
sole punitive measures for low-level criminal acts. See, e.g., Michelle Hillen, Rx for Jail Crunch: More
State Money, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2008, at 19, available at
http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2008/aug/24/rx-jail-crunch-more-state-money20080824/?subscriber-arkansas (noting that Pulaski County, Arkansas, started giving citations to
nonviolent offenders instead of jail time). To be sure, this is one approach that local governments could
take to save money yet still remain consistent to the principles of the broken windows approach to
community policing: that is, to decriminalize certain low-level, order maintenance offenses. See Howell,
supra note 46, at 316–18. Cities could create meaningful civil penalties, such as fines, to address and
discourage such undesirable behavior. See id. at 317. This potential option should not be mistaken as an
acceptance of such disorder or of moving away from the social norms-based approach that community
policing embraces. Rather, it could be seen as a conscious effort to enforce such community norms in a
manner that is less expensive but may be as effective. In decriminalizing such offenses, local
governments “open[] up possibilities for re-integrative and non-adversarial solutions that can strengthen
rather than undermine social order.” Id. It may also reduce the costs—financial and otherwise—to the
violator and the criminal justice system as detailed above. In these regards, decriminalization of certain
offenses may save money while remaining true to the tenets of the broken windows theory and
community policing more generally.
134. See Richard F. Belisle, Day Reporting Center Aims to Save Counties Jail Money, HERALDMAIL.COM (Apr. 19, 2009), http://articles.herald-mail.com/2009-04-19/news/25164957_1_jail-countiesprisoners (detailing the day reporting centers established in 2009 by the counties of Berkeley and
Jefferson in West Virginia).
135. See id.
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program successfully, they can avoid jail altogether and hopefully
avoid recidivism in the future.136
Counties have similarly adopted specialty courts to complement
such diversion programs, in an attempt to help offenders with their
underlying problems through social service programs and to avoid
recidivism. Many counties set up these courts to help channel those
whose criminal acts stem from drug addiction or mental health issues
into treatment programs that will help them deal with their
underlying problem. These programs serve as alternatives to simply
incarcerating these individuals and then, in all likelihood, releasing
them to commit the same types of crimes because their underlying
disorder was not addressed while in jail.137 For example, the City of
Greenwood, Minnesota, uses a program in which substance abusers
enter a recovery court program where the abuser lives at home but
cannot use drugs or alcohol and cannot live with anyone who uses
drugs.138 Recovery court supervisors randomly show up at the
participant’s house to check for alcohol or drug use and ensure
compliance with the program’s requirements.139 The program also
forbids participants from going to locations where drugs or alcohol
are used.140 If participants break these rules, they become subjected
to more restrictive rules and may ultimately be sent to jail.141 As this
example demonstrates, the purpose of such specialty courts is to
reduce recidivism by helping treat the criminal offender’s underlying

136. See id. DeKalb County, Georgia, instituted a similar diversion program for first-time offenders
charged with shoplifting, disorderly conduct, and other low-level offenses. If the offenders successfully
complete the diversion program, they can avoid jail time and save the county money through the
attendant reduced inmate costs. Daniel Beauregard, DeKalb Solicitor-General Kicks Off New Pre-Trial
Diversion
Program,
CHAMPION
NEWSPAPER
(Nov.
4,
2011),
http://www.championnewspaper.com/news/articles/1158dekalb-solicitor-general-kicks-off-new-pretrial-diversion-program1158.html.
137. See Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 420–
24 (2009).
138. Minnesota Program Gets Recovering Substance Abusers Back to Work, 17 WORKPLACE
SUBSTANCE ABUSE ADVISOR 20 (Sept. 19, 2003).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
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problem, while at the same time saving money by keeping them out
of jail initially.142
As described further below, some local governments are moving to
evidence-based practices to make “smarter” decisions as to how to
police their communities and how to administer their criminal justice
system. For example, Napa County, California, designed a matrix
program that rates prisoners on certain factors to determine who is
too dangerous to release before their sentences end and who is truly
nonviolent and could be eligible for diversion or early release
programs.143 “Graduates” of the Napa County matrix program have a
70% employment rate and only a 24% recidivism rate, compared to
the statewide recidivism rate of approximately 70%.144 The Napa
County model has been so successful that the American Civil
Liberties Union has called upon other California counties to develop
“evidence-based solutions for alternatives to incarceration and
reentry, instead of adding jail beds.”145
Finally, many local governments have shifted their operational
models to include enhanced technology that allows police
departments to improve their outcomes and increase efficiency.146
Some police departments have begun to use certain public
surveillance systems—such as closed circuit televisions and lightbased intervention systems—that “can act as force multipliers
through incident intervention and crime prevention, without requiring

142. See Joyce Wheeler, Witness for the Client: A Judge’s Role in Increasing Awareness in the
Defendant, 57 ME. L. REV. 463, 466–67 (2005).
143. See James Noonan, Napa Held Up as Example for Jail Strategies, NAPA VALLEY REG. (Sept. 21,
2011,
6:17
PM),
http://napavalleyregister.com/news/local/napa-held-up-as-example-for-jailstrategies/article_ba265284-e4b8-11e0-ab0e-001cc4c03286.html. Napa County adopted such a matrix
program in response to jail overcrowding and funding issues. See id. Sedgwick County, Kansas, also
adopted a matrix program called Metatomix, which is “a multi-database search tool that provides
authorized individuals the capability to view historical and current information from many agencies
about individuals passing through the criminal justice system.” SEDGWICK CNTY. PUB. SAFETY, supra
note 130, at 2. Metatomix allows officials to determine which inmates would be best suited for
incarceration alternatives such as drug courts, day reporting centers, and mental health courts. See id.
144. Noonan, supra note 143.
145. Letter from Abdi Soltani, Exec. Director of ACLU of N. Cal., to Exec. Comm. Members of the
Cmty.
Corrections
P’ship
(July
12,
2011),
http://www.aclunc.org/issues/criminal_justice/asset_upload_file541_10684.pdf.
146. CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 26.
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the immediate presence of an officer.”147 Other police departments
are using geographical technology such as the Tactical Automatic
Vehicle Locator, which reduces response times by providing the
locations of patrol cars and allowing commanders to dispatch the
closest patrol car with far greater precision and efficiency.148
Other police departments have taken greater leaps of faith with
technology due to severe budget cuts. For example, the Santa Cruz
Police Department (SCPD) has lost twenty percent of its force since
2000 due to budget cuts.149 To help meet the needs of its community,
the SCPD started experimenting with a predictive policing model.150
Based on technology that helps predict aftershocks of earthquakes,
this predictive policing model uses crime data to identify specific
areas, and even specific times, in which crime is most likely to
occur.151 This model enables the SCPD to send patrols to certain
“hotspots” each day, which it believes serves as a deterrent and
allows for better responsiveness—and thus likelihood of arrest—
when a crime occurs.152 Based on the perceived success of the
SCPD’s predictive policing model, other cities—such as Los
Angeles—are hoping to develop similar models, including ones that
model both property crimes and violent crimes.153 In an era of budget
cuts and reduced staffing, such technological advances and other
evidence-based strategies may help evolve community policing from
its historical model to an approach similar in theory, but different in
execution.

147. Id.
148. Id. at 27.
149. Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html.
150. Id.
151. Id. This model is similar to the CompStat model developed by the New York City Police
Department, but many argue that it is far more sophisticated because it is forward-looking in nature,
while CompStat is backward-looking. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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VII. EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION-MAKING AND MILWAUKEE COUNTY
A. Evidence-Based Decision-Making
With the changes and challenges that they have faced during the
past several years, some localities have concluded that they must
change their approach to community policing to continue to be
effective in the future. The economic realities of the Great Recession
coalesced with a national sentencing reform movement—led by the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC)—entitled “Getting Smarter
About Sentencing.”154 Two of the key objectives to this movement
were “to reduce reliance on long-term incarceration as a criminal
sanction for those not posing a substantial danger to the community
or committing the most serious offenders” and “to promote the
development, funding, and utilization of community-based
alternatives to incarceration for appropriate offenses.”155 At the same
time, the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) launched its
“Evidence-Based Decision Making in Local Criminal Justice
Systems” initiative.156 The NIC’s initiative was driven by the belief
that research could better inform decision-making in the criminal
justice system and that it would lead to better outcomes for public
safety and the community more generally.157 In this regard, the
confluence of these events helped bring greater clarity to the
problems, challenges, and needs of many communities and their
criminal justice systems. The goals were also similar and clear:
keeping communities safe, reducing recidivism, being mindful of the
costs of an incarceration-first approach to criminal justice, offender
rehabilitation, and providing community-based alternatives to
154. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GETTING SMARTER ABOUT SENTENCING:
NCSC’S
SENTENCING
REFORM
STUDY
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/Documents/Senten_GettingSmarter_SentencingReformSurvey_Fi
nalPub.pdf . The NCSC began this project in 2006 with the support of the Conference of Chief Justices
and the Conference of State Court Administrators. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 10.
156. See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY ET AL., A FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCED-BASED DECISION
MAKING
IN
LOCAL
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEMS
2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.cepp.com/documents/EBDM%20Framework.pdf.
157. Id.
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incarceration to help low-level offenders address their underlying
problems (such as mental illness or drug or alcohol addiction).158 In
short, “How can communities be smarter about running their criminal
justice systems?” Given the changes and movements in the criminal
justice system, evidenced-based decision-making began to gain
traction in some localities.159
Evidence-based decision-making in policing and in the criminal
justice system is modeled on the concept of evidence-based medicine
that has been popular in the health care field and human services
fields more broadly.160 Evidence-based decision-making seeks to
apply the best available evidence from empirically sound social
science research to decision-making in policing and the criminal
justice system more generally.161 Through experimentation, data
collection, and qualitative and quantitative analysis, evidence-based
decision-making seeks to identify the exact problem, propose
possible solutions that will address the problem, and analyze and
weigh the costs and impacts of the different solutions before
implementation.162 In this regard, evidence-based decision-making
158. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy
Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1307 (2007).
159. Evidence-based decision-making is sometimes linked to, or interchangeably described as,
evidence-based practices, Problem-Oriented Policing, Intelligence-led Policing, or HotSpot policing.
See Criminal Justice Policy Research Inst., Crime Analysis, PORTLAND ST. U.: HARTSFIELD SCH.
GOV’T, http://pdx.edu/cjpri/crime-analysis (last visited March 26, 2012).
160. See CRIME & JUSTICE INST., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE IN COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS:
THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
EFFECTIVE
INTERVENTION
2
(2004),
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019342.pdf. For more information on evidenced-based medicine, see
generally STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE CHALLENGE OF
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZATION IN HEALTH CARE 1 (2003).
161. See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY ET AL., supra note 156, at 7. Not all evidence has equal
weight, of course, as the strength and validity will vary depending on a number of factors, including
methodology of the study. Id. at 42. See also EDWARD T. JENNINGS, JR. & JEREMY L. HALL, EVIDENCEBASED PRACTICE AND THE USE OF INFORMATION IN STATE AGENCY DECISION-MAKING 8 (2009),
http://www.ifigr.org/workshop/spring09/jennings.pdf (listing a variety of factors to consider when
determining the strength of the evidence provided by social science research).
162. See URBAN INST., BEYOND IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND GUESSWORK: THE CASE FOR EVIDENCEBASED POLICY 1 (2008), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/901189_evidencebased.pdf. The
solutions can be judged by the various research and data related to categories such as increases in public
safety (including reduced recidivism, longer time periods between new offenses for released offenders,
fewer crimes from neighborhood “hotspots,” and the like); improved community wellness (fewer drug
or alcohol accidents or fatalities, fewer emergency room visits for crime-related injuries, and fewer
people going to jail or prison with mental health issues, to name but a few); increased satisfaction with
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seeks to use data and research of historical outcomes of previous
cases and decisions—such as releasing an offender on bail and on
what terms—and then using this information and those outcomes to
improve decision-making in similar cases in the future.163 By using
empirical findings to drive better-informed policies and practices in
the criminal justice system, localities can use evidence-based
decision-making in all aspects of public safety—from policing to
arrest to final disposition and discharge—to alter, and in some cases
retool, long-held approaches that are no longer economically
sustainable nor, perhaps, normatively desirable.164
In order to thoroughly inculcate evidence-based decision-making
in this manner, local governments must foster meaningful
collaboration between the partners in the criminal justice system and
those entities providing various social services to the community.
There are numerous key decision points with regard to those who
come into contact with the criminal justice system: contact with a
police officer (whether leading to an arrest, detention, treatment,
citation, or release); pretrial status matters (including release on
recognizance, bail, conditions of supervised release, and the like);
prosecutorial discretion (charging, diversion, deferred prosecution, or
dismissal); potential plea bargains; sentencing (length, conditions,
etc.); institutional intervention (for example, regarding treatment);
early release (both with regard to timing and conditions); community
intervention (decisions involving, for example, conditions and
supervision); violations of parole or probation (sanctions, treatment,
and the like); and discharge from the criminal justice system.165
There are numerous decision-makers and key stakeholders in the
criminal justice system and the social service system that may have
important overlap with problems experienced in the realm of public
the criminal justice system (improvement in survey responses, increased participation by victims, and
the like); and improvements in monetary and social costs of the criminal justice system (reduction in
crime rate, cost-savings for incarceration, and similar measurements). CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY
ET AL., supra note 156, at 22–24.
163. See Alan J. Borsuk, Get Smart?, MARQ. LAW., Fall 2011, at 22,
http://law.marquette.edu/assets/marquette-lawyers/pdf/marquette-lawyer/2011-fall/2011-fall-p20.pdf.
164. See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY ET AL., supra note 156, at 6–7.
165. Id. at 19.
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safety: law enforcement officers (police, sheriffs, and the like);
attorneys (prosecutors, public defenders, and other defense
attorneys); pretrial officials; court administrators; judges; victim
advocates; probation and parole officers; local elected and appointed
officials; state legislators; social service providers (for example,
those who treat alcohol and drug addiction); other local government
agencies that collaborate with those in the criminal justice system or
are affected by their decisions; and community stakeholders (such as
civic leaders, faith-based groups, and the like).166 Given these various
and interconnected decision points and the significant number of
decision-makers and stakeholder groups, a locality’s emphasis on
collaboration is critical to achieving the effectiveness and efficiency
sought by evidence-based decision-making.
Such collaboration may involve the police working with
prosecutors and other law enforcement professionals to solve a
problem—oftentimes a solution along the lines of a traditional
enforcement strategy such as arresting an individual and prosecuting
a crime.167 However, under the evidence-based decision-making
approach, law enforcement will also look to other governmental
agencies for assistance in solving various problems. For example, a
community prosecutor might work with a city’s building department
to identify code violations when targeting a drug house.168 However,
under this model, interagency collaboration also seeks to be proactive
to solve a community’s problems before they occur or in a manner
that addresses the underlying cause of the externalized problems so
that they dissipate over time. For example, having identified that
almost half of the violent crime victims in the city are teenagers,
Chicago has sought to expand after-school and summer programs to
engage at-risk youth in positive activities.169 Moreover, as discussed

166. Id.
167. See JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., COMMUNITY PROSECUTION STRATEGIES: MEASURING IMPACT 7
(2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/192826.pdf.
168. See Nugent-Borakove & Fanflik, supra note 4, at 223. Other interagency coordination may well
include schools, fire departments, health departments, and other city agencies that can help address
problems in the community. Id.
169. Emanuel Outlines Crime-Fighting Plan, CBSCHICAGO.COM (Jan. 10, 2011, 6:58 AM),
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above, the alternatives to incarceration for those offenders who are
mentally ill or suffer from drug or alcohol addiction also provide
examples of such collaboration between those in the criminal justice
system and social service providers. Finally, and perhaps most
relevant from a macro-level perspective, these various stakeholders
and decision-makers must collaborate to determine how the research
they have compiled and analyzed guides their decision-making at the
various decision points in the criminal justice system to further their
goals, set their priorities, and allocate their resources. Such
collaboration can lead to many of the types of alternatives to
incarceration—described above—that localities have implemented.
There is no doubt that part of what drives this evidence-based
decision-making approach is the recognition that with declining
revenues and budget cuts, police departments and criminal justice
systems must stretch their resources to do more with less.170 In doing
so, evidence-based decision-making strives to improve the
outcomes—and the efficiency and effectiveness—of the criminal
justice system while also saving money. In this regard, evidencebased decision-making may help local governments remain
consistent with the broken windows theory of community policing,
while addressing the problems presented by the Great Recession.171
B. Questions, Concerns, Criticisms, and Challenges
To be sure, with evidence-based decision-making still in its
infancy in policing and in the criminal justice system, there are still
many questions, concerns, and challenges that must be answered and
resolved.172 For example, politics still plays—and will likely continue
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/01/10/emanuel-outlines-crime-fighting-plan/.
170. See CRIME & JUSTICE INST., supra note 160, at 2–3.
171. See id. at 2.
172. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Evidence-Based Decision Making: Where are Defendants and
Their
Families?,
LIFE
SENTENCES
BLOG
(Mar.
20,
2011,
8:58
PM),
http://www.lifesentencesblog.com/?p=1870 (detailing costs imposed on defendants and their families
because of evidence-based decision-making); Michael M. O’Hear, Some Doubts About “EvidenceBased” Decision Making in Criminal Justice, LIFE SENTENCES BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011, 11:19 PM),
http://www.lifesentencesblog.com/?p=1471 (noting various concerns about evidence-based decisionmaking).
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to play—a critical role in policing and the criminal justice system, as
politicians do not want to be labeled “soft on crime.” Political
decision-making on public safety matters does not always comport
with decisions based on social science research. Indeed, political
decisions regarding public safety matters can be spurred by irrational
public “moral panics”—that is, a horrible crime that leads to “an
emotional wave of public repugnance and a demand for quick
political action.”173 Such reactive political decision-making may not
always be grounded in social science research, but rather a popular
political fix that assures the community that its public officials are
doing what constituents think is best—whether or not the data and
research support that reaction.
Another challenge for the adoption of evidence-based decisionmaking—either from a normative and/or logistical standpoint—is
that there are such divergent visions and philosophies for the optimal
approach to public safety and the criminal justice system.174 This
reality is exacerbated by the fact that there is a power imbalance
among the various agencies and stakeholders in the criminal justice
system, which makes the collaboration described above even more
challenging.175 To add to this difficulty, there is systemic
fragmentation in the way that various states and local governments
choose to structure and run their respective criminal justice
systems.176 This lack of uniformity creates a logistical impediment to
the emergence of a broad evidence-based decision-making
movement, as one model cannot be so easily replicated in most, if not
every, jurisdiction.177

173. NAT’L INST. OF CORR., WHITE PAPER: INNOVATORS’ GROUP VIDEO CONFERENCE #1, at 3
(2008),
http://evidence-basedmanagement.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/innovators_group_white_paper_1-5-09.pdf .
174. Id. at 3–4.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id.
177. But see CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POLICY ET AL., supra note 156, at 2 (noting that the
framework for evidence-based decision-making in local criminal justice systems is not aimed at a onesize-fits-all approach, but rather a broader framework with guiding principles that can be tailored to
meet the needs and structures of a particular locality’s criminal justice system).
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Finally, evidence is not always clear and can even be contradictory
at times, so there is still a need for good old-fashioned judgment in
making decisions involving policies, programs, resources, and the
like in policing and the criminal justice system—judgment that will,
no doubt, draw criticism from those who do not favor the decisions
made. Moreover, in the criminal justice field, there has not been a
deeply embedded research and knowledge-based culture, which may
lead to great resistance in adopting evidence-based decisionmaking.178 Even if desired, such a cultural shift may prove even more
difficult because the leadership in many criminal justice
organizations do not have the training necessary to effect
organizational change.179 Nevertheless, despite these criticisms,
questions, and challenges—for the reasons detailed above—several
localities have moved to adopt evidence-based decision-making in
their police departments and criminal justice systems more generally
as part of an evolution of their approach to community policing.
C. Milwaukee County: A Leader in Evidence-Based Decision-Making
Milwaukee County in Wisconsin (Milwaukee) is one of three local
governments from around the country that won a grant competition
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Institute of
Corrections (NIC) to encourage and help fund the adoption of more
evidence-based decision-making in the local criminal justice
system.180 Through the Milwaukee County Community Justice

178. NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 173, at 4. This resistance may be particularly acute because
police departments and other governmental agencies involved in the criminal justice system are
accustomed to making decisions based on accepted practices, instinct, and self-interest. Id.
179. Id. Moreover, judges may resist such changes as they may view it as curtailing their discretion
and independence. See Borsuk, supra note 163, at 25 (noting that some judges in Milwaukee County
have resisted evidence-based decision-making because it might affect their latitude in sentencing and
independence in other areas where they traditionally have had great discretion).
180. Steve Schultze, Milwaukee County Wins Federal Aid for Justice Programs, JSONLINE (Aug. 10,
2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/127464633.html. The other two awardees are Eau
Claire County, Wisconsin, and Mesa County, Colorado. Id. For a copy of Eau Claire’s application, see
EAU CLAIRE CNTY. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COLLABORATING COUNCIL, EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION
MAKING IN LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: PHASE III APPLICATION (2011),
http://www.co.eau-claire.wi.us/CountyDepartments/cjcc/docs/Eau_Claire_County_EBDM_Phase_III_a
pplication.pdf.
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Council (MCCJC)—a collaboration and partnership between the
various partners in the criminal justice system—Milwaukee has
sought to adopt and implement evidence-based decision-making over
the past few years.181 The MCCJC’s guiding principle in this
endeavor has been the following: “[I]n assessing an offender’s risk of
reoffense and criminogenic needs, and in matching offenders with the
appropriate supervision, treatment and jail resources, systems like
ours should employ instruments built on actuarial data, as opposed to
professional judgment alone.”182 Indeed, by using data and
research—described further below—Milwaukee believes it can
reduce the number of people being held in jails or prisons, save
significant amounts of money, and maintain or even improve the
level of public safety to which the community is accustomed.183
Moreover, consistent with one of the key tenets of evidence-based
decision-making, the MCCJC brings together a vast array of partners
and stakeholders in the Milwaukee criminal justice system: the Chief
Judge of the Milwaukee County Courts; the City Attorney of
Milwaukee; the District Attorney of Milwaukee County; the Sheriff
of Milwaukee County; the Mayor of Milwaukee; the Chief Executive
of Milwaukee County; the Health and Human Services Director of
the County; the Chief of the Milwaukee Police Department; and
representatives from community organizations, social service
providers, and the state legislature.184 While the collaborative group’s
members have not agreed on all matters at all times, they are united
181. Borsuk, supra note 163, at 20. The Milwaukee County Community Justice Council (MCCJC)
was formed in 2007 and states its mission to be “to efficiently and collaboratively coordinate services
and to effectively allocate financial resources to ensure crime reduction, victim support, offender
accountability, and restorative community-based programs.” MILWAUKEE CNTY. CMTY. JUSTICE
COUNCIL
BYLAWS
art.
III,
available
at
http://www.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/cjcouncil/byLaws.pdf. The various stakeholders that
founded the MCCJC—which include the County Executive, District Attorney, Sheriff, and Chief
Judge—did so as part of a settlement of lawsuits regarding overcrowding in the county jails. Borsuk,
supra note 163, at 20.
182. MILWAUKEE CNTY. CMTY. JUSTICE COUNCIL, EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LOCAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: PHASE III APPLICATION OF THE MILWAUKEE COLLABORATIVE 1, 8
(2011), http://www.publicpolicyforum.org/pdfs/EBDMMilwaukeeApplication.pdf.
183. Borsuk, supra note 163, at 22.
184. Full CJC Membership, GOMILWAUKEE, http://milwaukee.gov/cjc/CJCWholeCommittee.htm
(last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
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in advancing a meaningful and ambitious evidence-based decisionmaking approach to the criminal justice system.185
With the NIC grant, Milwaukee seeks to dramatically expand its
evidence-based decision-making, particularly in four key areas. First,
based on promising results from pilot projects in previous years, the
Milwaukee Police Department will train more of its field officers,
booking officers, and dispatchers as to how to respond effectively to
those who are mentally ill and to improve communication with others
in the criminal justice system—those in jails, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and court officials—regarding the challenges that these
individuals will face as they progress through the system.186 The
MCCJC will also be able to identify those chronic offenders with
mental illness who account for the majority of police service calls
and help them seek treatment for their underlying condition to avoid
future problems.187 To gauge its success in this effort, the MCCJC
has set a goal that by the end of 2013 it will have reduced by 25%
those suffering from a mental illness who lose their benefits or
housing for being jailed, and increase by 25% those who have a
mental illness who reconnect with services they need within twenty
days of arrest.188
Second, the MCCJC intends to use and enhance the information it
has to help identify cases that will likely be successful in a diversion
program or in a deferred prosecution scenario.189 The MCCJC will
use assessment tools to gauge the risks and needs of offenders and
negotiate the diversion or deferred prosecution agreement
accordingly.190 In addition, it will create an evidence-based matrix

185. See David A. Clarke Jr., Op-Ed, Let’s Treat Criminals Like . . . Criminals, JSONLINE (Feb. 19,
2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/116508233.html (Sheriff Clark, one of the Executive
Committee members of the MCCJC, expressing his opposition to some of the proposals put forth by the
MCCJC); MILWAUKEE CNTY. CMTY. JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 181, at 4 and App. 111 (noting
Sheriff Clark’s continued support for the work of the MCCJC and its pursuit to implement evidencebased decision-making).
186. MILWAUKEE CNTY. CMTY. JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 182, at 8–9.
187. Id. at 9.
188. Id. at 13.
189. Id. at 9.
190. Id.
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that delineates incentives and sanctions to ensure compliance with
this approach.191 To evaluate the efficacy of this program, the
MCCJC has set a three-fold goal by the end of 2013: (1) increasing
by 15% the number of pretrial detainees safely released and/or
supervised in the community as opposed to jail; (2) saving $1 million
in the process; and (3) reducing by a minimum of 40% the number of
defendants who fail to follow pretrial rules.192
Third, the MCCJC seeks to aggressively change its risk-needs
management of its pretrial population. Currently, Milwaukee’s bail
hearings are done in an ad hoc fashion where decisions are made
largely on the basis of the current charge, the defendant’s criminal
history, and the judge’s intuition and professional judgment.193 The
MCCJC has studied other jurisdictions’ approaches to pretrial
decisions and has developed a new protocol for conducting a risk
assessment for each individual as he or she enters the criminal justice
system.194 Based on the data and evidence from other jurisdictions,
this protocol will award points to a person based on factors such as
the number of previous criminal cases in which the person was
involved, the person’s record for appearing in court in those cases,
and whether he or she is employed or is a primary caregiver.195
Depending on the number of points the person gets, he or she will fall
into one of four categories that represents the risk level associated
with that person under the protocol.196 This categorization will then
be considered against the nature of the crime the person allegedly
committed.197 Judges will be equipped with a grid that helps them
determine whether (and at what amount) to set bail and what
conditions, if any, should be placed on a defendant’s release.198 The
MCCJC envisions this type of informed evidence-based decision-

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 10.
MILWAUKEE CNTY. CMTY. JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 182, at 13.
Id. at 10.
See Borsuk, supra note 163, at 22.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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making will ensure maximization of the various pretrial supervision
and detention options.199 In order to gauge whether it has been
successful with this program, the MCCJC has set a goal of increasing
by ten percent the number of successful diversions or deferred
prosecutions and saving a minimum of $350,000 in doing so by the
end of 2013.200
Finally, the MCJCC wants to adopt a “dosage-based” probation
plan.201 Based on research demonstrating that probation services are
unnecessary after a certain period of time, Milwaukee seeks to begin
a pilot program that provides early termination of probation for
probationers who accomplish certain risk-reducing objectives.202 The
MCCJC will do so by creating a program based on evidence from
this research, developing a profile of the type of probationer that
might be successful in such a program, tracking the group, and
comparing it to other probationers to test the efficacy of the
program.203 Probation, then, would be terminated early once the
offender received sufficient treatment as defined by this program. To
measure its success with this plan, the MCCJC has set a goal to be
able to prove by the end of 2013 that Milwaukee can cut probation
costs and reduce recidivism by a minimum of fifty percent.204
In these regards, Milwaukee seeks to not just be tough on crime,
but also be “smart” on crime.205 For example, twenty-six percemt of
those in Milwaukee County jails awaiting trial have bail set at $500
or less, but they cannot afford to pay it to be released.206 However, it
costs Milwaukee $141 per person per night to keep these individuals
in jail.207 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the evidence

199. See id. at 22.
200. MILWAUKEE CNTY. CMTY. JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 182, at 13.
201. Borsuk, supra note 163, at 22.
202. MILWAUKEE CNTY. CMTY. JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 182, at 11–12.
203. Id. at 12.
204. Id. at 13.
205. See Borsuk, supra note 162, at 20 (quoting Milwaukee County District Attorney John T.
Chisolm: “Both sides of the political spectrum must acknowledge that talking tough on crime has
reached its limits. Being smart on crime is the solution.”).
206. Id. at 26.
207. Id.
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collected by the MCCJC demonstrates that these individuals would
not pose even a moderate risk to the community if released—as
demonstrated by their incredibly low bail.208 This problem
demonstrates economic inefficiencies in the current system that do
not protect the community from any meaningful risk. The
aforementioned reforms in pretrial decision-making attempt to create
a “smarter” criminal justice system in Milwaukee based on evidence
that informs those in the system as to how to treat, on the one hand,
the large majority of cases that involve low-level, non-dangerous
offenders and, on the other hand, those that involve violent or
dangerous defendants.209 In this regard, the MCCJC endeavors to
protect the public, but make sensible, cost-effective, and evidencebased decisions regarding those offenders who do not pose a
meaningful risk to the community and who have a high likelihood of
reform through various interventions. In doing so, Milwaukee strives
to stay consistent with the broken windows approach to community
policing, while also grappling with the financial realities it faces.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Will the Great Recession mark the beginning of the end of
community policing and the broken windows theory? It is highly
unlikely. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the financial and
budgetary realities that cities and police departments currently face—
and may face for some time—pose challenges to continuing a broken
windows theory approach to community policing in most localities.
While some of the non-essential, cost-cutting measures may help
maintain a good portion of the police and criminal justice
infrastructure necessary to continue this approach in some
communities, the reality is that most cities are experiencing deep
208. Id.
209. Id. at 25 (quoting Milwaukee County District Attorney John T. Chisolm: “Risk evaluation
presumes that some offenders must be incapacitated and removed from the community in an appropriate
way for an appropriate time, but it also allows, based on validated experience, that the majority of
offenders can respond effectively to intervention and not consume justice resources without changing
behavior.”).
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enough cuts in their officer ranks, non-officer personnel, and other
resources that some impact will occur. Police departments may have
to do more with less, but they may also have to determine that certain
aspects of police services that they used to provide—e.g., responses
to non-bodily injury traffic accidents, illegal parking, every burglar
alarm (whether it is confirmed that a burglar entered the home or
building), and the like—are no longer sustainable at current staffing
and funding levels. An interesting possibility to watch in the coming
years is whether the police’s non-responsiveness to such low-level
crimes and signs of disorder wind up signaling a lack of social order
in those communities that have adopted such policies and whether
that leads to a devolution in crime consistent with the broken
windows theory.
These difficult economic times pose such a challenge for many
communities because the broken windows approach to community
policing is a resource- and time-intensive model for dealing with
crime. While some question whether this approach has contributed
to—or is responsible for—the reduction in crime during the past two
decades, it is clear that the law enforcement community has
embraced this approach and is likely unwilling to abandon it unless
absolutely necessary.210 However, as detailed above, changes in
police structuring and practices have already begun, and they may
continue for years into the future, as the effects of the economic
downturn are still impacting local governments today.211 These
tumultuous times may provide an opportunity for many communities
to rethink their broken windows theory approach to community
policing and restructure it in a manner that remains consistent with
the theory, but properly balances the economic realities that they

210. Howell, supra note 46, at 276. See also Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows:
New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 277
(2006) (arguing that empirical evidence does not support the broken windows theory of community
policing).
211. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 75, at 10–11 (citing statistics that many
police departments anticipate more budget cuts in 2011 and that ninety-eight percent of responding
police departments anticipate that the current economic downturn will be at least somewhat problematic
in 2012).
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face. The evidence-based decision-making approach in Milwaukee is
by no means a singular example of the types of creative and
potentially more efficacious responses to the criminal justice and
social service needs in a community that attempt to comport with
tighter and smaller budgets. Indeed, it is one of many examples that
could become a trend given current circumstances. For in such
challenges may lie opportunity for police departments and the
criminal justice and social service systems more generally to
innovate, become more efficient, and still remain true to the broken
windows approach to community policing.

